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Abstract: A method has been developed with the objective of making the potentially intractable 
problem of launch vehicle failure propagation somewhat less intractable. The approach taken is to 
essentially decouple the potentially multi-stepped propagation process into a series of bi-component 
transition probabilities. These probabilities are then used within a simple Monte Carlo simulation 
process through which the more complex behavior evolves. The process is described using a simple 
model problem and some discussion of enhancements for real-world applications is included. The role 
of the model within a broader analysis process for assessing abort effectiveness from launch vehicle 
failure modes is also described. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Crewed launch vehicle ascent risk assessment requires consideration of two primary elements: the 
reliability of the launch vehicle and the effectiveness of the abort process should a failure of the launch 
vehicle occur. The reliability of the launch vehicle is typically provided in the form of failure scenario 
types with quantified probabilities. Characterization of launch system safety then builds upon the 
characterization of the system’s reliability by developing an understanding of the consequences of the 
system’s failure modes. Three factors that contribute significantly to crew safety in the face of a 
launch vehicle failure are: 1) the type of end state resulting from progression of the vehicle failure 
(e.g., confined explosion, vehicle breakup, vehicle dynamics, etc.), 2) the time required to reach that 
end state with respect to the time at which the failure is detected (i.e., the warning time), and 3) the 
severity of the resulting environments. The environment severity might, for example, be represented in 
terms of the time required for the crew module to reach a distance at which it can endure the 
environment created. The relative importance of each factor depends on the system’s capabilities with 
respect to the other factors. For example, if failures are contained such that severe environments are 
rarely developed, then warning time and/or strong abort acceleration are less important. Conversely, if 
failures are detected early relative to the generation of severe environments, detailed knowledge 
regarding the failure propagation becomes less essential. The ability to detect catastrophic failures 
early enough to provide significant warning time is typically difficult to guarantee and, therefore, it is 
important to understand the potential failure propagation paths of the given launch vehicle when 
assessing the potential for successful abort. 
 
Previous work within the Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center 
[1,2] has focused on characterizing the end-state environments. Specifically, this work has integrated 
blast overpressure and debris modeling with abort system capabilities to provide failure probabilities 
as functions of mission time and warning time. The present work represents an effort to address the 
failure propagation aspect of the problem, i.e., determining the probability that failure environments 
will be created at all, given the occurrence of a specific launch vehicle failure mode. In the past, this 
propagation has been represented by relatively simple mappings, e.g., the probability of a stage 
explosion given an uncontained engine failure. These mappings have been based to a large extent on 
engineering judgment and expert opinion, supported occasionally with physics-based analysis. The 
ultimate objective of this work is to obtain this quantitative mapping information through a more 
systematic application of physics-based modeling and simulation. Further, it is envisioned that the 
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inherent complexity involved in the failure propagation process would be "automatically" reflected as 
the result of capturing relatively simple interactions between pairs of many components. Clearly, the 
failure propagation process is one with large uncertainties attached and, at some level, engineering 
judgment will be necessary in performing the analysis. Ideally, however, the analyses will be framed 
such that the judgment required pertains to parameters with which engineers are more familiar. For 
example, the question of the probability that stage explosion follows engine explosion is replaced with 
questions such as the speed and number of fragments generated by an uncontained engine event. 
 
This paper will describe a process that the ERA team has developed to address the failure propagation 
problem, which is thought to represent a step toward the objectives described above. The process has 
been applied in support of NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Program. For the SLS analysis, the 
propagation process is coupled with a characterization of the failure environments to produce data 
tables, which are then used to assess launch vehicle failure-related loss-of-crew (LOC) probabilities.  
 
1.1 Definitions 
 
Some critical components of the analysis process are defined below. 
 
 Loss-of-Mission Environments (LOMEs) – Local conditions existing at the time of loss of 
mission, i.e., loss of critical functionality. These are the starting conditions for the analysis 
described in this document and are, therefore, occasionally referred to as “initiators.” LOMEs 
generally do not pose a direct threat to the crew or crew module, but have the potential to 
propagate in such a way that larger energy releases are produced, either in the initiating 
element or adjacent elements of the architecture. 
 Element-Level Environments (ELEs) – Environments generated by a single vehicle 
architecture element (stage) that have the potential to directly threaten the crew or crew 
module. For example, an ELE can be either a solid rocket booster (SRB) case burst or a liquid 
stage confined-by-missile (CBM) explosion. These are composed of one or more sub-
environments, such as blast overpressure, explosion-generated debris or shrapnel, and/or 
radiant heating from a fireball. 
 Vehicle-Level Environments (VLEs) – The complete environment resulting from the initial 
failure. The set of VLEs includes the null case in which no ELEs are created and generally are 
composed of zero or more ELEs occurring nearly simultaneously. These may result from the 
initiator generating multiple ELEs simultaneously or from propagation of one ELE to another. 
 Abortability – The probability of successfully surviving the environments produced given a 
launch vehicle failure. Abortability can be assessed with respect to a specific failure type (e.g., 
LOME), or in an integrated sense, given a characterization of the relative likelihoods of 
various types of launch vehicle failures (failure probabilities). Because the analysis in this 
study is performed independently of the failure probabilities, it is only capable of providing 
abortability with respect to a specific failure type. 
 Warning Time – The time interval between the moment that the abort vehicle has begun to 
separate from the launch vehicle and the moment that the explosive event is initiated. Note 
that other definitions of warning time exist in other contexts, but this is the definition used for 
the abortability table development. 
 Aft Skirt – This term has been used to refer to an enclosed engine section between the aft 
propellant tank dome and a close-out located somewhere along the engine nozzle, aft of the 
engine combustion chamber and turbopumps. 
 
2 PROPAGATION PROCESS 
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A schematic of the propagation process is shown in Figure 1. At the center of the process is a recursive 
algorithm that traverses what is called the propagation matrix and, in the process, creates a tree of 
failure events. The initial event tree generated through this process will then be "pruned" to ensure that 
the events in the tree are all compatible with one another such that the propagation is, in fact, 
realizable. Finally, end-state, or element-level, environments are identified. These steps are applied 
repetitively within a Monte Carlo process during which the results are binned according to the 
combination of end-state environments encountered. 
 
Figure 1. Failure propagation process schematic. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Propagation Matrix 
 
The propagation matrix serves as the primary input to the propagation evolution algorithm, with 
diagonal cells representing the various environments that have been identified as potentially 
contributing to the failure propagation process and off-diagonal elements capturing the potential for 
transition between these environments. A simple example of a propagation matrix is shown in  
Figure 2. 
 
The diagonal elements can be classified according to whether they are initial states (blue in Figure 2), 
intermediate states (yellow), or end states (red). Initial states in the context of propagation are the 
Loss-of-Mission Environments, i.e., the conditions that exist at the time the mission is lost (e.g., 
engine turbopump burst). Intermediate states are environments that are not considered to occur 
naturally without the occurrence of another failure environment, but that may contribute to the 
propagation process. For example, high-pressure tanks in the engine section may be thought to be so 
reliable that spontaneous explosion is not considered, but they may burst if struck by other failure-
generated debris. Finally, the element-level environments described above are also included along the 
diagonal of the propagation matrix.  
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Figure 2. Example of a simple propagation matrix. 
 
 
 
 
One requirement of the propagation algorithm is that the results should be independent of the order in 
which the environments are placed along the diagonal. The result of re-ordering these elements should 
only be to cause some off-diagonal probabilities to be shifted from above the diagonal to below, or 
vice versa. 
 
The transition probability in a given off-diagonal cell represents the probability that the environment 
lying horizontally at the diagonal (source environment) will generate the environment lying vertically 
at the diagonal (target environment). For example, the 15% transition probability in the 4th column of 
the 1st row indicates a 15% probability that the turbopump burst will cause a rupture of the high-
pressure helium tank. Typically,engineering judgment is applied initially to rule out many of the 
potential transitions (blank cells). In other cases, the transitions are not initially ruled out, but may 
ultimately be set to zero because analysis shows the transition is either not ever credible or is not 
possible under certain conditions. For example, in early mission phases for which the aft propellant 
tank is relatively full, the possibility for fragments from aft explosions to penetrate the intertank walls 
enabling a confined explosion is considered virtually zero. 
 
2.2 Propagation Simulation 
 
The data in the propagation matrix is used to flesh out a particular propagation scenario by starting at a 
user-specified initial condition (one of the blue boxes) and "rolling the dice" against each of the 
transition probabilities in the associated row of the propagation matrix. Here, rolling the dice consists 
of generating a random number in Matlab and evaluating it against the transition probability to 
determine whether a "hit" is observed. Given a hit, the same process is applied to the target 
environment, i.e., the target becomes the source for the next step. An environment is not allowed to 
recur along a given propagation path. 
 
Figure 3 shows an illustration of one such path that might be generated in response to the inputs of 
Figure 2, starting with stage 1 turbopump burst. In this case, the turbopump burst releases shrapnel 
that impacts and ruptures the high-pressure helium tanks. Overpressure and/or shrapnel from the 
helium tank rupture then causes leakage into the aft skirt volume. This flammable mass is assumed to 
be ignited, causing an explosion that ruptures the aft propellant tank, which is then driven into the 
upper stage causing rupture of the upper stage tanks. 
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Figure 3. Sample failure propagation path. 
 
 
 
 
This propagation scenario is somewhat unique in the sense that it is a single path. In fact, the nature of 
the propagation matrix shown allows for much more complexity because multiple hits could be 
observed from a given source environment. For example, shrapnel from the turbopump may create 
leakage as well as impact the helium tank. Each of those triggered target environments would then be 
used as source environments for subsequent propagation, and so on, with the final result being a 
potentially complex tree structure of environments. In the present model, each of the non-zero 
transition probabilities in the row associated with a given environment is queried independently. If no 
transitions are triggered, then the process ends for that path. The algorithm makes use of tree data 
structures and is coded in Matlab. 
 
This approach is not dynamic in the sense that transition probabilities at a given point in the process 
might be influenced by preceding events. The present implementation assumes transition probabilities 
from a given state are independent of how that state was reached. This is a recognized limitation and is 
being studied to determine whether it can be removed or whether a substantially different approach is 
required. 
 
2.3 Event Trees and Pruning 
 
An example of an event tree that might be produced with this model is shown in Figure 4a. The 
simplicity of the example propagation matrix leads to relatively simple trees. However, one still 
observes branching in this case. In these plots, element-level environments are highlighted in red. One 
can also observe that, while no environments are repeated along either branch, stage 1 tank rupture 
occurs on both branches. In a sense, the branches are incompatible with each other. Furthermore, if the 
tank is ruptured by the aft skirt explosion, one might question whether the confined explosion (CBM) 
in the intertank region is possible. 
 
In order to address these issues, a pruning process is applied to these raw event trees. The pruning 
depends on the introduction of some timing information, which may be physical time associated with 
the transition process if available, but in the simplest case may be a fixed time increment analogous to 
a computer clock cycle. All that is needed is to be able to identify which event happened first. The 
present model allows the user to specify an uncertain range of transition times, which are sampled and 
accumulated during the development of the raw trees. Then, all the events in a given propagation are 
sorted in chronological order of their occurrence, and repeat environments are removed along with any 
subsequent events on that "branch" of the tree.  
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Figure 4. Propagation event trees. 
 
 
 
a) Unpruned tree    b) After pruning 
 
 
The model also allows the user to specify groups of environments for which, if the first environment in 
the group has been triggered, all other subsequent environments in the group are thought to be 
impossible and are removed from the tree. In the present case, an example of an "exclusion group" 
would be {stage 1 tank rupture, stage 1 intertank CBM}. That is, rupture of the tanks precludes 
subsequent confined explosions. The reverse is not true, however; occurrence of a confined explosion 
does not prevent a subsequent unconfined explosion. In fact, it is highly likely that non-confined 
explosion(s) will follow a confined explosion. Thus, the exclusion is based only on the first 
environment in the group.  
 
Figure 4b shows the effect of applying such a pruning process to the tree shown in Figure 4a. For 
clarity, two fixed time intervals are used in this case: 0.01 and 0.1. The resulting tree indicates that, in 
this case, the intertank CBM occurs earlier than the tank rupture caused by the aft skirt explosion, and 
so the latter has been removed. 
 
2.4 End States and Monte Carlo 
 
The final step in analyzing a single instance of the propagation is to identify and log the final state. 
This simply involves collecting all of the element-level environments that have been triggered, e.g., 
the red environments in Figure 4. Since each of the N possible ELEs can be triggered or not, there are 
2N possible outcomes. These combinations of ELEs have been termed vehicle-level environments 
(VLEs). Note, one of the VLEs is the null environment, which is the case where none of the ELEs are 
generated. 
 
The probabilities in the propagation matrix are effectively integrated using a Monte Carlo approach 
with the outcome of each instance categorized in terms of the particular combination (of the 2N 
possible) of ELEs observed. The end result of the Monte Carlo process is a distribution among the 
possible VLEs, such as the example shown in  
Figure 5. Note that only 3 of the 8 possible VLEs have been encountered, with the null environment 
the most likely in the current example. 
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Figure 5. Example of Monte Carlo result for mapping Stage 1 turbopump failure. 
 
 
 
3 COMBINING PROPAGATION AND ENVIRONMENT CHARACTERIZATION: 
ABORTABILITY 
 
The mapping information resulting from the Monte Carlo simulations provides the probabilities of 
different classes of outcomes given the initial failure manifestation. What is ultimately needed is the 
probability of the crew surviving the environments generated as a result of the initial failure 
manifestation. To obtain these probabilities, the mapping information of the type shown above must be 
coupled with the failure environment information. Blast overpressure and debris environment 
characterization are discussed in [1] and [2], respectively. 
 
The ERA team characterizes failure environment severity using tables containing probabilities of 
failure from overpressure or debris as functions of mission time and available warning time. These 
tables include effects of the environment initiation, environment propagation and decay, abort 
trajectories, and crew module vulnerability to overpressure and debris. The environments can be 
generated using different assumptions regarding the initiation (blast location, blast yield, debris 
catalogs, etc.) to represent effects from explosions of different parts of the vehicle. The individual 
tables for overpressure and debris may be convolved into tables for the element-level environments, 
for example, stage 1 CBM. Under the assumption that the ELEs involved in a given VLE are triggered 
simultaneously, tables for each possible VLE can be generated using a similar convolution of the 
associated ELE tables. 
 
Assuming simultaneous ELE generation allows the VLEs to be characterized in terms of loss-of-crew 
probability as functions of mission time and available warning time given the combination of ELEs. In 
this form, these tables are independent of the propagation. Tables for loss-of-crew probability given 
the occurrence of the initial failure manifestation type (LOME) are generated by combining the set of 
VLE tables using a simple weighted average in which the weightings are the mapping probabilities 
generated through the propagation analysis, e.g., those shown in  
Figure 5. 
 
Finally, abortability (1 – PLOC) for a specific failure scenario and mission time is obtained, given its 
initial manifestation (LOME), by querying the appropriate table at the appropriate mission time with 
an estimated warning time. The present form of the propagation modeling does not address the 
important problem of warning time estimations, but could potentially be extended to do so. 
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4 IMPLEMENTATION ENHANCEMENTS 
 
The approach used in the preceding sections is somewhat limited in the sense that maintaining the 
propagation matrices can quickly become unwieldy if one wants to account for variations of the 
transition probabilities with mission time or phase. This can be important if the transitions are effected 
through blast overpressure, for example, or another mechanism that depends upon ambient pressure. 
Further, these transition probabilities are often subject to large uncertainties, either because they are, at 
least initially, based on engineering judgment or because the process itself is inherently sensitive to 
small differences in the failure initiation. One may want to investigate and capture the effect of these 
uncertainties on the propagation. These issues have been addressed using a relatively compact input 
data format, maintained in an Excel spreadsheet, and a Matlab script that queries the Excel data and 
generates the propagation matrix on-the-fly. 
 
A section of a sample input data table is shown in Figure 6. Each row represents one potentially non-
zero element of the propagation matrix. In the present implementation, a static, qualitative propagation 
matrix is maintained in which transition probabilities in the off-diagonals are replaced by pointers to 
the appropriate row of the data table. The table allows the transition probabilities to be varied with 
mission phase, with each column representing a different phase. Within each cell, a range of values 
may be captured, separated by slashes, with different values capturing different parts of an uncertain 
distribution. Typically, the left-most value is considered a lower bound, the right-most is the upper 
bound, and the middle value is a "baseline" value. Higher values tend to allow the propagation to more 
easily reach the explosion outcomes so the left-most values are typically referred to as the pessimistic 
or worst-case set and the right-most values are then the optimistic or best-case set. Colors can be used 
to represent the level of confidence in the quantitative transition probabilities provided.  
 
This format also allows for convenient documentation (not shown) for specific information regarding 
the source of the data and any other pertinent information. Also, with this data format, it is relatively 
easy to implement additional features that may require additional supporting data (e.g., the timing 
information). 
 
Figure 6. Sample input data for the propagation analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows an example of the effect of the phase-dependent transition probabilities on the VLE 
mappings. In this case, the probability of an aft skirt explosion to cause rupture of the 1st stage 
propellant tank diminishes with altitude resulting in the trend toward fewer tank ruptures in later 
mission phases.  
 
The most recent analysis of the SLS vehicle involves 24 environments, including 13 initiating 
environments and 10 ELEs. The analysis is further complicated by the need to divide the ascent 
trajectory into 15 separate mission phases. The present data format and pre-processing scripts allow 
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relatively straightforward representation of this complexity as well as a way to track progress in the 
maturation of the transition probability data.  
 
 
Figure 7. Phase-dependent mapping results: Stage 1 turbopump failure. 
 
 
 
5 TRANSITION PROBABILITY SPECIFICATION 
 
One feature of the current propagation model is that a simple representation can be created and applied 
relatively quickly. As the vehicle design matures and/or more detailed questions are asked, additional 
elements/environments can be introduced. The transition data upon which the analysis is based can 
also mature, starting with a set of transition probabilities that may be largely based on engineering 
judgment and evolving into a set that is supported predominantly by analysis. Even analysis-based 
transition probabilities will have uncertainties associated with them, but in general, the transition from 
judgment-based probabilities to analysis-based probabilities would be accompanied by a reduction in 
the data spread. 
 
The current thought process for specifying the transition probabilities begins, for a given source and 
target environment, with an effort to identify the mode by which the source effects the failure of the 
target. Five general classifications have been identified for these modes: 
1) energy transfer from the source, either by blast overpressure, kinetic energy (fragments), or 
heat transfer, 
2) structural shock or vibration from failure of the source causes the failure of the target, 
3) an environment created by a source failure, such as a flammable mass or pressure 
environment, cannot be withstood by the target, 
4) the ability of the target to contain its energy may depend on the source functionality, e.g., loss 
of fuel to the engine combustion chamber caused by turbopump failure leads to combustion 
chamber failure, and 
5) direct transfer. 
 
Direct transfer captures cases in which the LOM environment presents a direct threat to the crew. For 
algorithmic convenience, these situations have been treated with a separate LOME and ELE within the 
propagation matrix, but with a direct transition between them (100% always). Solid rocket booster 
burst is an example of such a case. 
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Relatively simple analyses may be sufficient to provide significant insight into reasonable settings for 
transition probabilities. Figure 8 shows an example of a simple geometric assessment of the likelihood 
of debris from a given turbopump burst impacting a high-pressure pneumatic support tank. Here, the 
debris pattern is expected to disperse within a limited azimuthal range perpendicular to the rotation 
axis of the pump. The figure indicates a fragment probability distribution with respect to this angle, 
and the target tank lies within one tail of the distribution. A rough estimate of the debris strike 
probability would be given by: 
 
Pstrike =1-e
-lN
 
 
where  is the number of fragments released and  is given by 
 
l = FR /pd  
 
Here, F represents the shaded area under the curve in Figure 8, R is the radius of the target tank, and d 
is the distance from the source to the target. This accounts for the distributed dispersion shown in 
Figure 8 as well as uniform dispersion in the circumferential direction. 
 
Figure 8. Example of simple geometric strike probability analysis. 
 
 
 
 
The failure probability given a strike would depend on the likely velocities of the debris, e.g., the spin 
velocity of the pump (likely conservative), as well as the vulnerability of the target tank, e.g., the 
ballistic limit velocity based on the material of the tank and some estimate of the fragment sizes. The 
transition probability from turbopump burst to high-pressure tank burst would then be set to the strike 
probability if the debris velocity exceeds the limit velocity for puncture, or would be set to zero 
otherwise. 
 
The threat posed by the main combustion chamber could be similarly analyzed, except that the angular 
distribution and initial velocities of the debris would be different (see [3] for a discussion of modeling 
pressure vessel burst velocities). This simple example illustrates how analysis methods do not 
necessarily eliminate uncertainty—many unanswered questions remain regarding the number of 
fragments released, the initial velocity after escape from the pump walls, the true vulnerability of the 
tanks to debris, etc. However, the nature of the uncertainty is such that engineering judgment can 
perhaps be more reliable. Further, these questions are more amenable to engineering analysis  than is 
the question of the probability of stage explosion given an engine failure. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
A relatively simple method to address the complex problem of failure propagation following launch 
vehicle failure has been presented. The method is extensible in the sense that one can generate a 
simple model for a given scenario and evolve it to account for additional factors as the vehicle design, 
or the need to understand the behavior, matures. Presently, the model is used only to capture the 
propagation of one energy-containing component to another in the cascade of events that might 
connect a local vehicle failure manifestation to crew-threatening explosion. The analysis has to date, 
therefore, been limited to determining the probability of explosion given various classes of vehicle 
failures. 
 
Extension of the model to include realistic transition timing information as well as detection elements 
that might be activated in response to triggering certain environments, is currently under 
consideration. In this way, the model could potentially be applied to the problem of estimating abort 
warning time. 
 
Ultimately, the approach envisioned is a system in which the components identified as potential 
contributors to the propagation process are defined in terms of engineering parameters such as 
contained pressure and temperature, wall thickness and material, etc. These engineering parameters 
would then be used to determine both potential threat of the components as sources (e.g., burst 
overpressure, fragment environments) as well as their vulnerabilities as targets. The off-diagonal terms 
in the propagation matrix would capture the relationships between the diagonal components: the 
distances, view factors, obstructions, etc. Given that these component and relationship properties are 
defined, transition probabilities could be generated automatically. This is in work by the present 
authors.  
 
A separate effort is underway to apply the Monte Carlo process directly to uncertain elements in the 
component properties: the number of thrown fragments, the burst yield, component vulnerabilities, etc. 
Relationships in this model would be evaluated automatically through the direct use of CAD design 
data. This approach, while more complex to implement, would potentially provide a fully coupled 
simulation and would therefore relieve any limitations introduced by decoupling. 
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